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National Pay Bargaining: please write to TESCO not the
Times
Alan Manning considers the merits of local wage bargaining and argues that it would
cause more problems than it would solve. He maintains that we should be making the
existing system work better, not moving to a system that works just fine in an economics
textbook but is rejected by the private sector.
On 19 September a long list of  very distinguished economists (including some of  my
LSE colleagues) wrote to the Times suggesting that national pay bargaining in the
public sector be abandoned and replaced by individual wage bargaining at local level.
This adds to the general crit icism of  public sector pay determination being made f rom George Osborne
down.
The argument is that national pay bargaining is too inf lexible, that public sector workers in London are
paid too litt le, that in some parts of  the country public sector workers are paid too much. There is some
truth to these claims but to assume that individual wage bargaining is the solution deserves closer
consideration.
The letter was addressed to the government suggesting it act now to introduce more local negotiation
into public sector pay. But the letter could just as well have been addressed to the chief  executives of
most large private-sector f irms such as high-street retailers who are f ree to choose their system of  pay
determination and yet do not choose local pay bargaining as envisaged by the letter. In 2011 TESCO
agreed a 2.5 per cent national pay rise when surely the letter ’s authors think they should have been
pursuing a localism agenda.
The pay system these private companies choose does vary but is of ten of  the f orm of  a national pay
scale with a relatively small number of  supplements f or high cost areas. In addition there is a limited
amount of  discretion given to local managers to use supplements to deal with local recruitment and
retention problems. That is they have some local variation in pay but do not achieve this through local
wage determination. The system these private-sector employers use is actually very close to the pay
structures in the public sector that also uses High Cost Area Supplements and, contrary to apparent
widespread belief , there are in most of  those systems the ability of  local managers to pay local
recruitment and retention premia. I think it is a f air comment that the way in which this system is used in
the private sector is probably better than in the public sector (we may complain it is hard to recruit nurses
and teachers in London but are the queues at the checkout in Waitrose longer?). But it is not the system
itself  that is at f ault, it  is the way it ’s operated.
Why don’t private sector f irms all use local wage bargaining? I think they understand the advantage of
tailoring pay to local conditions that is the central idea behind the letter. But they also understand that
wage levels are quite similar across many parts of  the UK and that local wage determination is extremely
costly, that setting wages uses resources and can lead to mistakes. When the authors of  the letter ask
f or local wage bargaining, they are silent on how local. Will every primary school negotiate pay with all of
its teachers? I doubt they think that a sensible proposal. So perhaps pay should be determined at local
education authority level?
But that also leads to problems. One has to remember that LEAs or NHS trusts have in some parts of
the country considerable market power over parts of  their workf orce who have specialized skills. If  the
local NHS trust held down nurse pay, many of  the nurses would have litt le choice but to accept that
because there are no alternative local employers f or their skills. These are not hypothetical f ears – this
is what happens. In the United States there is a perennial shortage of  nurses because each individual
employer has an incentive to keep pay low but collectively pay is not high enough to induce people to
enter the prof ession. And in the UK throughout the 1990s the government tried to inject more localism
into public sector pay determination along the lines proposed by the letter. For example in 1995 nurses
were given a 1 per cent national pay rise but local trusts could add up to 2 per cent extra. The result was
not pretty. Through a combination of  short- termism, incompetence and naked exploitation, most trusts
took advantage of  this f reedom to pay nothing extra and nurse pay f ell relative to median earnings. This
was not a f all to the level of  wages we would have in a competit ive labour market – we ended up with a
level of  vacancies in the NHS more like that to be f ound in McDonalds yet trusts ref used to raise wages
to deal with the problem. Eventually the localism agenda had to be abandoned, there was a return to
national pay determination and a sizeable pay rise f or nurses as can be seen in the f igure below.
There are already worrying signs that public-sector employers may be up to their old tricks again. A
number of  NHS trusts in the South-West have joined together in the SW Pay, Terms and Conditions
Consortium to try to take a joint approach to pay issues. At the time of  writ ing it remains very unclear
what will be the outcome of  this but if  all the sellers of  baked beans in the south-west got together to
discuss pricing they would rightly be prosecuted under the competit ion laws. In contrast employer
collusion to determine pay is regarded as a posit ive move in many quarters.
So we have good reason to think that a f orced move to local pay bargaining would cause more problems
than it would solve. But this is not to say that the current system is without its problems.
As the f igure shows, National pay determination has led to excessive volatility in public sector pay as it
has been an attractive option f or cash-strapped governments to hold down public sector pay but this
stores up problems f or the f uture requiring an eventual large correction (I should add that I am a
supporter of  the current public sector pay squeeze). It does seem dif f icult within the f ramework of  the
current system to induce suf f icient regional variation in pay, it does seem dif f icult to get local employers
to take advantage of  the discretion they do have.
I was a member of  the NHS Pay Review Body f rom 2004 to 2011 and I do regret not pushing f or a higher
London allowance. I don’t think it would have made any dif f erence as there was very litt le interest in that
agenda f rom others but I do think I should have tried because, as work f rom my colleague John van
Reenen (a signatory of  the letter) and others has shown the consequence of  nurse pay in London being
too low is that death rates are higher. But we should be making the existing system work better, not
moving to a system that works just f ine in an economics textbook but is rejected by the private sector
and when it has been f orced on the public sector in the past has led to such obvious problems.
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